How does public access to criminal records affect crime? Economic theory suggests that expanding access to criminal information may increase the cost of crime to potential criminals by endangering their future work prospects and thus act as a deterrent. However, increased provision of information could also obstruct ex-convicts from finding legal employment and lead to higher recidivism rates. I exploit the state and time variation in the introduction of state-maintained online criminal databaseswhich represent a sharp drop in the cost and effort of gaining criminal background information on another personto empirically investigate the trade-off between deterrence and recidivism. I find that online criminal records lead to a small net reduction in property crime rates, but also a marked increase of approximately 11 percent in recidivism among ex-offenders. ______________________________________ *
Introduction
How does public access to criminal records affect crime? On one hand, greater provision of criminal background information may increase the opportunity cost of crime to potential criminals by endangering their future work prospects and thus act as a crime deterrent. Public criminal records could also act as a deterrent through fear of expulsion from socially rewarding networks. On the other hand, online criminal records may make it difficult for ex-convicts to find legitimate employment and lead to higher recidivism rates. This theoretical tradeoff between deterrence and recidivism is precisely why the topic of public criminal records is highly debated among public policy makers, the media, and legal scholars, but thus far there has been no empirical evidence on what the actual impact of public records is on crime. This paper examines the trade-off between deterrence and recidivism brought by public electronic access to criminal records, in a context of direct interest to policy makers.
There are a number of reasons to believe that public access to criminal information may affect criminal behavior. First, existing research (utilizing experiments or longitudinal data combined with instruments) suggests there is a causal and negative impact of a criminal record on employment and wages (Kling 1999; Pager 2003; Finlay 2008) . Holzer et al. (2004) survey more than 3000 establishments in metropolitan areas and show that most employers eschew hiring someone with a criminal history. From a theoretical viewpoint, the role of the social stigma from a criminal record could also act as a deterrent (Rasmusen 1996) .
Second, since the late 1990s, a number of states began to publish criminal information of ex-offenders online. These databases are easily accessible to anyone with an Internet connection, and represent a large drop in the cost and effort required of obtaining criminal background information on another person. Before the introduction of online criminal history websites, state background checks were significantly harder to obtain (Silverman 2004; Winn 2004) . Depending on the state, one might have had to go from county to county to obtain court records manually. While some state police departments do offer centralized paper-based background checks, the procedures can be complicated and requests take up to several weeks to process. Other states maintain a closed records policy and provide no access to criminal records at all. 1 Third, employers are increasingly taking advantage of the wired nature of the labor market to screen job applicants (Autor 2001) . Although there is no state panel data on the number of record checks requested, anecdotal evidence indicate these websites gained widespread traction among both the public and employers quickly. 2 One reason for their rapid uptake is because a growing proportion of employers are mandated to screen their applicants, including most health professions and licensed occupations. Even for employers who are not legally obligated to perform them, background checks have become a routine procedure (Holzer et al. 2004) . The growing number of negligence suits that place liability on employers have led them to become increasingly cautious about whom they hire (Harris and Keller 2004) .
Given the compelling reasons that potential criminals would respond to incentives created by the posting of criminal records online, what does it imply for recidivism? Recidivism, in a criminal justice context, can be defined as the reversion of an individual to criminal behavior after he or she has been through the correctional system (Maltz 2001) . As the title of the paper suggests, a criminal record can stigmatize as a modern day "scarlet letter" and thus operate as an 1 A number of state police departments do not provide background checks unless accompanied by notarized authorized release of the subject. Other states require fingerprints for official state background checks and do not offer name-based checks. 2 For example, the state of Washington conducted 170,532 queries in 1998 when its website was introduced, and the number rose to 793,613 by 2003 (Washington State Bureau of Investigation, article available at http://washingtontechnology.com/articles/1998/07/17/washington-states-lucrative-history-lesson.aspx). Florida gets around 2 million searches per year and Pennsylvania gets 800,000 searches per year ("More Prisoners, parolees listed on Web", Associated Press Online, by Ian Hopper) informal sanction and deterrent. On the flip side, it may drive an ex-convict towards recidivism because of diminished employment opportunities or wage penalties (Funk 2004) . Empirical studies of ex-offenders emphasize the role of legal employment in keeping ex-offenders from recidivating (Berk et al. 1980 , Uggen 2000 . If the substantial expansion of criminal information to the public does hinder ex-offenders from obtaining legal employment, as evidence suggests, then online criminal records may lead to higher recidivism rates. Reporting Program, which contains information about whether the prisoner had a felony conviction prior to his release and also tracks parolee exits. The impact on recidivism is explored in two ways. First, I measure recidivism as a prisoner being admitted with a prior felony record, and examine whether that likelihood is higher due to the publishing of online criminal records. I also examine whether online records increase the probability of parolees of being readmitted to prison. The results show that consistent with theory, increased public access to criminal records is associated with higher recidivism -I find that a prisoner admitted is approximately 11 percent more likely to have a prior felony record and a parolee is 10 percent more likely to be returned to prison. These results are robust to controlling for a host of individual characteristics and prison conditions, as well as the implementation of the three-strike laws across states in the 1990s. I also demonstrate that the recidivism results are not driven by selection of a "worse" mix of criminals, where first-time offenders are being deterred and the behavior of repeat offenders are unaffected. A back-of-the-envelope decomposition combining the result of 2.5% reduction in net crime and 11% increase in the likelihood of recidivism among ex-offenders would yield that online criminal records led to an overall reduction of approximately 8.7% for crimes among first-time offenders.
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, this paper is to my knowledge one of the few studies examining the determinants of recidivism using recent data 6 that is close to a national scale. 3 Previous work on recidivism is sparse mainly because data sources are limited as previously mentioned. It is important to study the determinants of recidivism because the rates of recidivism in the United States are higha conservative estimate is that one out of three released prisoners return to prison within three years (Langan and Levin 2002) , causing the U.S. to have the highest correctional population in the world despite falling crime rates since the 1990s. Are released prisoners recidivating because they are irrational career criminals or are there ways to rehabilitate them? My results provide evidence that recidivism does respond in a way that is consistent with rational behavior. Second, this paper provides empirical evidence towards an ongoing policy debate. The results also highlight that the incentives facing a first time offender and an ex-offender could be very different; the dynamic nature of criminal behavior over the lifetime is something that has not been sufficiently addressed in the literature. In this case, the same policy of public access to criminal information could be a double edged sword. Finally, expanding public access to information is especially deserving of study as a potential policy to deter crime as it is inexpensive to host records online, relative to other deterrence mechanisms such as incarceration.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a brief history of the different types of background checks available by state, and the motivation behind the launching of such websites.
Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the empirical strategy and results on overall crime. Section 5 presents the empirical strategy and results on recidivism. Section 6 concludes.
Background on Online Criminal Databases
Within a state, I describe three possible channels through which one could gain electronic access to criminal records. From the public's perspective, the information provided through 3 Existing related studies that study post-release behavior of criminals that rely on data from a single state or jurisdiction are Kuziemko (2007) , Owens (2009) , Lee and McCrary (2009). these channels are the same. For states which provide access to criminal records through one or more channels, I consider the channel which was introduced earliest. Table 1 provides the earliest year and the agency that provides the offender information for each state. The earliest that a state began to post criminal records on the Internet is Florida in 1997, and the most recent state in the sample to do so is Vermont in 2008. As it can be seen from Figure 1 , there is substantial variation in the timing and the channel through which state criminal records were made online.
The first channel to obtain criminal background records is the "official" route, provided by the State Police Bureau or the Department of Public Safety. This channel requires the person requesting the information to provide at least the full name of the individual of interest, and usually the date of birth, and to pay a fee ranging from under $10 to $25 (see Appendix Figure 1 for an example of one of these websites). The rationale for placing offender records on the Internet for this channel appears to stem from the passage of the Brady Handgun Act in 1993 that required states to automate criminal records in order to facilitate background checks for gun purchasers. Certain states, in particular those that had statutes allowing members of the public to request criminal records (of other people) from the police department, eventually moved criminal records onto the internet to minimize transaction costs. This could also be seen as part of an overall trend in recent years of government agencies striving to be more transparent by posting information the public have access rights to online, including real estate and vital (birth and death) records.
The second channel through which to obtain criminal history information is through the Department of Corrections (DOC), where some states post records of all previously incarcerated persons. 4 While these records are unofficial, 5 they provide essentially the same or more detailed information as a criminal record check obtained from the state police department, including past offenses, date of birth, incarceration history, and sometimes even photographs and tattoo details of the offender. These searches are always free (see Appendix Figure 2 ). The primary motive behind these websites seems to be public safety, and to provide peace of mind for past victims of crime by allowing them to keep tabs on the status of offenders (New York State Department of Corrections).
The third channel I consider is through the state Administrator of Courts (AOC). A number of states have placed court records online, which (often but not always) include criminal records. A case search can be performed based on name alone, and the records contain enough details to ascertain the offense type, name, race, date of birth of the person (see Appendix Figure   3 ). A few states charge a small fee, but most provide access for free. For online court records, the migration from paper to electronic appeared to be driven mainly by the desire to streamline the court system for both court users and administrators, which would explain why in most states the posting of court records was accompanied by other technological advances such as electronic filing. Another reason that is frequently mentioned in the law literature is to improve the transparency of the judicial process (Winn 2004 , Sudbeck 2006 Table 1 gives the mean and standard deviation of the arrest rates for offenses used in the robustness check.
Next, I augment the crime data with demographic data from the U.S. Census Bureau Population Estimates. Education levels are estimated using the annual CPS March supplements (King et al., 2010) . Unemployment rates and disposable income data are obtained from the Critically, the data on released prisoners contain information on whether the prisoner has a prior felony conviction. I utilize this information to define the individual as a recidivist if he had a prior felony conviction and is committed to prison with a new sentence (reconviction). 7 I define a second recidivism variable using the parolee exit data, which is unity if the parolee is returned to prison (reincarceration). Unfortunately, some of the states did not differentiate between the parolee being returned to prison for a technical parole violation versus a new sentence, and as such may not accurately capture recidivism since parole violations do not necessarily involve criminal behavior. The results using this second definition of recidivism variable using the parolee data should therefore be interpreted more as a robustness check.
This paper utilizes the prisoners released and parolee exit data from 1998, 1999, 2001, and 2004. 8 Table 1 presents summary statistics of key variables from the prisoners released data and parolee exits data, respectively. Encouragingly, the statistics from Panel B and C are comparable. This is perhaps not a surprise, since close to 80 percent of all prisoners are now released on parole.
More than a quarter of prisoners admitted were recidivists in that they had a prior felony record were resentenced to prison within 3 years from their release (Langan & Levin 2002) . The characteristics of prisoners in Panels B and C are also comparable: almost all of the prisoners are male; close to half are black; and less than 1 percent of prisoners have a college degree.
Using NCRP data to investigate recidivism is not without its limitations. The main drawback is the lack of complete criminal historythere is no information on the number of prior felony records, the type of offense the prior felony conviction was for, or when the prior felony was committed. It would be instructive to understand which types of offenders are being affected by the provision of online criminal records. Nonetheless, this paper is to my knowledge one of the few studies examining recidivism using recent data that is close to a national scale. 
Effect of Online Criminal Records on Overall Crime

Endogeneity of Timing
The natural concern with using a differences-in-differences approach is endogeneity in the timing of such changes to identify their causal effects, i.e., there are factors not controlled for in Equation (1) that are correlated with state agencies' decision to place records online. I argue that endogeneity is unlikely to be a problem in this context for a few reasons. First, in most states the provision of records on the Internet was not mandated by the passage of new laws.
Rather, the actual laws that permit public access to records have existed for many years, but the actual costs of accessing the records still remain high (i.e., one has to physically visit individual courthouse to search for records). Further, there is considerable variation in the number of years between the enactment of public access laws and when records went online. 9 The lateral movement from paper to online appeared to have been governed by factors that had little to do with policies directly related to crime.
Second, I utilize a combination of independent agencies that provide records online, which should limit the problem of endogeneity. Strikingly, there is no state where all three agencies provide access to criminal records simultaneously. Further, there are several states where the procedure of obtaining an official "paper" background check is considerably involved, i.e., it requires fingerprints, notarized release forms, and more than several weeks to process, but court records or DOC records are freely available online. For example, Arizona is a closed records state where official background checks are restricted to justice-authorized agencies, but, in 2000, was one of the first states to put criminal history of previously incarcerated felons on their Department of Corrections website. New York presents a similar example.
To empirically address the concern of endogeneity, I regress (1 if Online_Records remains close to before and statistically significant. Column (3) allows for region-by-year fixed effects to capture any non-linear evolution of crime rates common to states in the same Census region. Column (3) also includes a falsification test by including a placebo dummy set to unity three years before the criminal database was launched in that state.
Reassuringly, the coefficient of the dummy is small and insignificant, implying that reduction in crime rates is not picking up some other intervention that may have preceded the rollout of the databases. Columns (4)-(6) repeats the same specifications used in Columns (1) Next, I examine the effect on specific property crimes (Table 4 ). I find a significant reduction in burglary of 82 incidents per 100,000 population, and a reduction in larceny of 145 incidents per 100,000 population. The reduction in burglary corresponds to an approximate 4.3-4.8 percent drop (Columns 4 & 7) . However, the effect is less conclusive in regards to larcenythe estimate on larceny is not statistically different from zero when using log rates (Column 5), but yields an estimate of -4.1 percent (statistically significant at 10 percent) when using a Poisson model (Column 7). There is no discernible impact on car theft regardless of specification. 12 11 All Poisson estimations use population as the exposure variable. 12 One explanation for the lack of effect on auto theft could be that the arrest rate for car theft is relatively low (see Appendix Table 1 ), implying that potential car theft criminals could be less deterred than for crimes with higher probabilities of arrest.
Is there any impact of online criminal records on violent crimes? The results in Table 5 show negative coefficients but statistically insignificant results. The incidence rates of violent crimes are much lower, which is one reason why the estimates are imprecise. The Poisson estimates (Columns 7-9) may be more reliable in the case of violent crimes because of the low incidence rates. Although the estimates still lack desired levels of precision, the coefficients are very close to zero and are statistically different from the estimates with property crimes as the dependent variable (at the 10 percent level).
These Compared to the existing literature on crime deterrence mechanisms, the deterrence effect found in this paper appears relatively small. 13 Helland and Tabarrok (2007) exploit the three strikes legislation in California to compare the group of criminals with two strikes with the control group of those who were tried for a second strikeable offense but convicted of a nonstrikeable offense. They find that California's three strike legislation significantly reduces felony arrest rates among the class of criminals with two strikes by 17-20 percent. In related work, Kessler and Levitt (1999) estimate a deterrent effect of sentence enhancements using 13 It is somewhat difficult to compare the results of this paper directly to the existing literature on deterrence mechanisms, since this paper relies mainly on a dichotomous change in a policy, whereas most other papers examine changes in variables (for example, size of police force or expected sentence length) that permit an elasticity calculation (e.g. a 1 percent increase in expected sentence corresponds to x percent drop in crime).
California's Proposition 8, and find a reduction in eligible crimes by 4 percent in the year following its passage and 8 percent 3 years after its passage. Policy-wise, perhaps the most comparable paper to this is the forthcoming paper by Prescott and Rockoff (2010) , who examine the impact of sex offender registration and notification laws on criminal behavior. Overall, they estimate that putting a notification law in place deters -1.07 yearly sex offenses per 10,000 people, which represents approximately an 11 percent reduction.
Robustness Check
Most states keep juvenile criminal records confidential, meaning that juvenile records cannot be accessed by anyone except for select justice agencies. If the mechanism is indeed through the provision of online criminal records, then there should not be an observed impact on crime committed by juveniles. (1) and (2) consists of states that do not release juvenile criminal records to the public. The estimates imply that online records decreased arrests among adults by around 15 per 100,000 in the population, which represents around a 4 percent reduction. At the same time, is small and insignificant, suggesting that there is little negative effect on arrest rates of juveniles.
Using juveniles as a control group would not be valid if they do not respond as adults do to deterrence incentives, for example, because of shorter time horizons (Lee and McCrary 2010) .
However, Mocan and Rees (2005) , using microdata from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health, find that juveniles do respond to incentives and sanctions as predicted by economic theory: employment opportunities, increased family income and stricter punishments are effective tools in reducing juvenile crime. Levitt (1998) find a large negative elasticity of -0.40 with respect to sentence punitiveness. Nonetheless, I address this concern by running a second robustness check. If it were the case that juveniles will not be deterred by online criminal records, then I should find similar results to those in the first two columns of Table 6 for states that do publish juvenile records. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 6 presents the results for estimating Equation (3) using only the sample of states that publish juvenile records.
Interestingly, for these states, becomes negative and statistically significant (at the 10 percent level), whereas is statistically insignificant, implying that in states that publish juvenile records, there is a uniformly negative deterrent effect on both adults and juveniles alike, with little difference in impact for the two broad groups. Taken together, the results from Table 6 provide corroborative evidence that the driving mechanism in the reduction in crime is indeed through the online provision of criminal records.
Effect of Online Criminal Records on Recidivism
Estimating Equation -Recidivism
The next portion of the empirical analysis focuses on the effect of online criminal records on recidivism. Ideally, the time ex-felons spend in prison rehabilitates them so that they return to their communities as productive citizens. However, if the publishing of criminal background information online impedes ex-felons from finding legitimate employment, or cause them to suffer a large wage discount, the benefits of repeat criminal behavior could outweigh the costs. 14 There could thus be an important trade-off between the deterrent effect of public access to criminal records and higher recidivism rates.
Using the NCRP prisoners released data ( assesses whether a prisoner released in year r is more likely to be returned to prison due to the provision of online criminal records. (4) is the same specification as Column (3) but also includes a placebo dummy set at unity three years before the actual launch year. The estimate of the placebo dummy is small and insignificant. The results imply that expanding public access to criminal information is associated with higher recidivism rates, insofar as the prisoner admitted is more likely to be a repeat offender in states after criminal records are published online.
Results on Recidivism
The results from estimating Equation (4), where recidivism is defined as reincarceration, support those from Equation (3). As in Table 7 , the first column in Table 8 Research Project, Berk et al. (1980) find that each week of employment reduces the number of arrests among ex-offenders by 0.03. In the National Supported Work Demonstration Project, exoffenders were randomly assigned to treatment and control groups, where those in the treatment group were offered minimum wage jobs. Uggen (2000) finds that the treatment lowered the probability of arrest by approximately 22%. In addition to the evidence that having a criminal record hurts employment opportunities substantially, the results on recidivism of this paper are certainly not unreasonable. Further, the results from this paper, both on overall crime and recidivism, are consistent with the findings of Prescott and Rockoff (2010) , who investigate the impact of registration and notification laws on sex offenses. They find that community notification deters first-time sex offenses, but increases recidivism by registered offenders. 17
5.3
Are the Results Driven by Selection?
One way I define recidivism is as the probability of an admitted prisoner having a prior felony conviction, which could lead to concerns that the result of higher recidivism is driven by selection. If first time offenders are now being deterred, then the pool of prisoner admissions would be comprised of a "worse" mix, i.e., a larger proportion of repeat offenders versus first time offenders, which would lead to higher recidivism even without changes in criminal behavior of repeat offenders.
I present a back-of-the-envelope exercise to show that the mechanism driving the recidivism result is not selection. Suppose the extreme case that ex-offenders are not affected at all, which would imply the reduction of crime of roughly 2.5% takes place entirely among first time offenders. Assuming that prior to the introduction of online criminal records 1/3 of criminals are recidivists (a generally accepted recidivism statistic), then the introduction of online records would reduce the number of first time offenders to X * 2/3 * 0.975 = 0.65X, where X is the initial total criminal population. The number of recidivists remains at 1/3 X.
This would lead the proportion of repeat offenders admitted to prison to become 1/3X/(1/3X + 0.65X) = 0.3389, i.e., there should only be a 0.56 percentage point increase. Given that I find an increase of around 3.6 percentage point in the probability of a prisoner admitted being a repeat offender, it cannot be that the mechanism driving my result is selection of prisoners admitted.
However, my result could be upward biased (with an upper bound of around 0.56 percentage points based on this exercise).
Impact on First-Time Offenders
How does the introduction of online criminal records affect first-time offenders given the results on net crime and recidivism? A rough estimate of the impact can be backed out through the following calculation. First, I find a 2.5 percent reduction in net property crime, which represents a drop of 166 crimes per 100,000 population (Table 3 ). This implies that the number of crimes prior to the introduction of criminal records, which is comprised of first time offenses and repeat offenses, is 6640 (=166/0.025) per 100,000 population. Next, assuming again that a third of crimes are committed by recidivists prior to the introduction of online criminal records, then the number of first time offenses would be 4427 (= 6640 -6640 * 1/3). After the introduction of online criminal records, the probability of recidivism increased by approximately 10% and net crime reduced by 2.5%, which would yield that first time offenses fell to 4039 (= (6640 -166) -1/3 * 6640 * 1.1). This implies that first time offenses were reduced by approximately 8.7 percent.
Conclusion
Using stigma as a deterrence device is by no means a new technologythe method of public shaming has been used since ancient times. For example, scars and branding have traditionally been used as a form of indelible criminal record. What are the ramifications of the modern day scarlet letter? While part of the intended purpose of providing Internet access to criminal records is to improve public safety, the actual impact has never been fully evaluated.
This paper provides the first attempt at examining the effect of expanding public access to criminal history through online records on overall crime and recidivism. I find that placing records online leads to a net reduction in property crimes of approximately 2.5 percent. This reduction can be interpreted to be among first-time offenders. A back-of-the-envelope calculation based on cost per crime estimates in Miller et al. (1996) , suggests that the net benefit associated with the introduction of online criminal records is roughly $2.13 (in 2009 dollars) per person.
As the results of this paper imply, however, the unintended consequences of allowing widespread access to criminal records are higher recidivism rates among ex-offenders. I find that the probability of recidivism among ex-offenders rises by slightly more than 10 percent.
Putting the results on net crime and recidivism together would imply that there is an 8.7 percent reduction in crime among first-time offenders. Although crime rates have been falling since the early 1990s, prison population has been escalating in part due to the so-called "revolving door" phenomenon of correctional system. Further, given the high proportion of disadvantaged black males among the offender population, and the evidence that having a criminal record hurts blacks more than whites (Pager 2003) , allowing widespread access to criminal records may not help achieve the economic goal of equity. Thus, while public access to criminal records may be a cost-effective method of deterring first-time offenders, a broader examination of the social costs as related to ex-offenders is needed. 1998 , 1999 . Source for Panel C: National Corrections RP Parolees Exit Data. 1998 , 1999 . 1998, 1999, 2001, 2004 .
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-Individual controls include: male, black, hispanic origin, age and age squared at year of prison admission, sentence length in months, sentence length in months squared, some high school, high school completion or GED, some college, or college degree.
-Robust standard errors are clustered at the state level. Unit of observation is at the individual/state/year of admission level.
( -The placebo dummy is set to unity three years before the actual website launch.
-State controls include unemployment rate, log(population), log(real disposable income in 2000 $), number of police employed per capita, and police expenditures per capita (in 2000 $), number of correctional staff employed per capita, correctional expenditures per capita (in 2000 $), and whether the state has a three-strikes law.
Source: National Corrections Reporting Program Parolee Exit Data, 1998 Data, , 1999 Data, , 2001 Data, , 2004 .
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